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Abstract 
 
We examine the effects of economic transition on the pattern and costs of worker 
displacement in Ukraine, using the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) for 
the years 1992 to 2002. Displacement rates in the Ukrainian labor market average between 3.4 
and 4.8 percent of employment, roughly in line with levels typically observed in several 
Western economies, but considerably larger than in Russia.  The characteristics of displaced 
workers are similar to those displaced in the West, in so far as displacement is concentrated 
on the less skilled.  Around one third of displaced workers find re-employment immediately 
while the majority continues into long-term non-employment. The wage costs of displacement 
for the sub-sample of displaced workers do not seem to be large.  The main cost for displaced 
workers in Ukraine consists in the extremely long non-employment spell that the average 
worker experiences after layoff.  
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1. Introduction 
The labor markets of the successor states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), excluding 
the Baltic states, are often thought to display different adjustment patterns after the initial 
transition shock than the labor markets of Central Europe. Dramatically falling real wages, 
wage arrears and unpaid forced leave for a large fraction of the workforce were the most 
important mechanisms, with which enterprises responded to a collapse in the demand for their 
products. Since these mechanisms effectively lowered the cost of labor, a moderate rate of 
labor shedding in Russia and other countries of the Common Wealth of Independent States 
(CIS)3 was observed over an extended period.4 Anecdotal evidence from the Ukraine suggests 
that these adjustment mechanisms were more prevalent even than in Russia for most of the 
nineties.5  As a consequence, Konings, Kupets, and Lehmann (2003) find a moderate 
aggregate rate of labor shedding in the nineties in the Ukrainian labor market. However, these 
authors as well as Brown and Earle (2003) also establish that relentless gross job and worker 
reallocation was behind the small net fall in employment, a pattern which has continued after 
the Ukrainian economy began growing again in 2000. In such an environment, job 
displacement might be important.   
Despite the extensive literature that examines large-scale privatization and structural 
reforms in developing and transition economies, e.g. Djankow and Murell (2002), little has 
been written about job displacement in these countries.  Kletzer (1998) and Kuhn (2002) 
summarize the large empirical Western literature on job displacement which establishes the 
extent, incidence, and costs of displacement. These issues are particularly pertinent for 
transition economies in which institutional structures are often evolving rapidly alongside 
mass privatization, large scale restructuring, and the reallocation of labor.  
The Western literature on displacement focuses on seniority, firm-specific human capital 
premia, and union wage premia as the main reasons that displaced workers experience 
substantial earnings losses. For Europe, Kuhn (2002) shows that the cost of job loss is lower 
than in the United States or in Britain. This result appears to be driven by institutional features 
in Europe that cushion unemployment income, job search, and pay in return jobs.  However, 
we may not observe similar features in a transition economy, because institutional factors are 
less likely to attenuate the costs of job loss (Lehmann, Philips, and Wadsworth, 2005).   
                                                          
3 The states of the FSU without the Baltic States 
4 For Russia, see for example, Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1999), Earle and Sabirianova (2002), and 
Earle and Lehmann (2002). 
5 Standing and Zsoldos (2001) provide some hard evidence for Ukrainian industry on this point. 
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Little empirical evidence exists to distinguish among these possible outcomes in 
transition economies. Orazem, Vodopivec and Wu (2004), examine official administrative 
data on workers displaced in Slovenia between 1987 and 1993. They find substantial long-
term unemployment among displaced workers but real wage growth, on average, for those 
who find new work. However, large real wage cuts are taken by workers with 25 or more 
years of work experience.  For Estonia, Lehmann, Philips, and Wadsworth (2005) show that 
displacement rates were very large compared to Western countries in the early stage of 
transition but fell back toward average Western levels in the later, mature period of transition. 
They also find that, like in the West, less-skilled workers and those workers with short job 
tenure experience displacement disproportionately. The main cost of being displaced from a 
job is the income loss due to non-employment rather than a wage penalty for those who return 
to work. For Russia, Earle and Sabiarianova Peter (2004) maintain that the incidence of 
displacement is extremely low.  However, their evidence is based on the responses of 
managers who might have an incentive to understate the real level of displacement. While 
there are also problems with worker survey data (see e.g. Kuhn, 2002), our nationally 
representative data set allows us for the first time to obtain a general estimate of the incidence 
of displacement in a labor market of the CIS.                
With more rapid restructuring and labor reallocation than in the West, a transition 
economy might create a sufficiently dynamic environment in which individuals could move 
quickly between jobs and productivity levels in the new or restructured sectors might offer 
relatively good wage prospects. In this case, the costs of job loss would be small. In the 
Ukraine, a more dynamic environment has existed since the period of rapid economic growth 
began in the 2000.  Conversely, the potential costs of job loss could be high because 
unemployment benefit payments, which despite being earnings-related, are low and strict 
eligibility criteria exclude many of the unemployed, (Lehmann, Kupets, and Pignatti, 2005).  
As a consequence, most displaced individuals excluded from benefit would have to try to 
return to work quickly. If high search costs then compromise efficient matching this could 
increase the intensive cost of displacement by raising the likelihood of wage penalties 
associated with displacement.  Other potential costs of job loss stem from differences in 
wages between old and new jobs. For a majority of Ukrainian workers, wages after transition 
were still tied to Soviet wage grids. This process recognized seniority so that higher tenured 
workers could expect to receive higher wages. If such workers lose their jobs, the skills 
acquired under the old regime may not be in demand in a restructuring, transition economy, as 
Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000) argue. Hence, older workers are likely to suffer most from 
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displacement. Lehmann, Kupets, and Pignatti (2005) document large job creation rates in the 
new private sector in Ukraine. If these new jobs are high productivity jobs as the evidence in 
their paper seems to suggest, displaced workers could obtain wages in their new job that 
would be comparable to, or higher than those in the previous job.  Ukrainian employment 
protection legislation is comparable to that in many West European countries so that, other 
things equal, the incidence of job loss should be broadly comparable. However, compliance 
with legal provisions has been particularly problematic. Trade unions play a minor role in the 
Ukrainian wage determination process, like in most transition economies. 
With no clear theoretical guidance as to the likely wage change following 
displacement and eventual re-employment in a transition economy, empirical evidence is 
required.  This will have important policy implications, in particular for Ukraine where the 
economy will still need to undergo a major restructuring effort. If displaced workers can find 
new work relatively quickly and receive wages that exceed those in their former job, 
policymakers will have less concern over job displacement than in a situation characterized 
by long-term unemployment and a future of low paying jobs.   
In what follows, we analyze changes in the pattern of displacement for two distinct 
periods of transition, the years 1992 to 1997 and 1998 to 2002. The first period is 
characterized by a deep depression accompanied by a prolonged episode of hyperinflation, 
and subsequently the implementation of restrictive stabilization policies that result in a stable 
currency by 1997. By 1998, the “transition cycle” had reached a trough, with GDP growth in 
1999 and accelerated growth since the year 2000. For the two periods, we differentiate the 
characteristics of displaced workers from other workers who experience joblessness and from 
those workers who manage to avoid non-employment. We investigate whether displaced 
workers experience longer or shorter non-employment spells and whether systematic 
differences arise between the two groups of job separations. For the second period, when 
inflation and the currency had stabilized, we also analyze earnings changes associated with 
displacement to establish the pecuniary costs of job displacement.  
The next section outlines the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) data 
used in our study and section 3 discusses the general patterns of displacement and the 
incidence of job loss in Ukraine. Sections 4 and 5 look at the two main components of the 
costs of job loss, i.e. the duration of non-employment and the potential income losses of 
displaced workers who find a new job. Section 6 offers some conclusions on the overall cost 
of displacement and on social policy. 
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2. The Data  
Our principal source of information is the ULMS, a nationally representative survey, 
similar to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), of around 4,000 households 
and approximately 8,500 individuals, undertaken for the first time in the spring of 2003. A 
household questionnaire contains items on the demographic structure of the household, its 
income and expenditure patterns together with living conditions. A more detailed description 
of the genesis and the content of the data set can be found in Lehmann and Haisken-DeNew 
(2005). The core of the survey is the individual questionnaire, which elicits detailed 
information concerning the labor market experience of Ukrainian workers. There is an 
extensive retrospective section, which tracks workers’ labor market involvement at specific 
past points in time (December 1986 and December 1991) and which allows a complete 
reconstruction of workers’ labor market histories between January 1998 and the date of the 
interview.  The responses allow us to estimate annual separation, displacement and quit rates 
along with the duration (in months) of any non-employment spell resulting from a separation. 
The data also identify job moves that involve no intervening spell of non-employment 
following a separation. These job-to-job moves are given the value 1 (month) and the value of 
one is added to all other monthly duration spells to facilitate the estimation process. To 
analyze hazard rates from non-employment, we use discrete time hazard estimation methods 
because the spell data are measured in monthly intervals. Sample size limitations prevent us 
from distinguishing between those displaced workers who entered unemployment and those 
who became economically inactive. We therefore count any jobless spell as a period of non-
employment. Often the same non-employment spell involves periods of both unemployment 
and economic inactivity and the degree of search activity which conditions classification into 
these states might be considered endogenous to the rate of job offer arrival.   
Table A1 in the appendix demonstrates how we construct a measure of displaced workers 
that mirrors the one used in the Western literature in which displaced workers are typically 
classified as those who are separated involuntarily from their jobs by mass layoff or plant 
closure. The ULMS allows us to distinguish between job loss because of plant closure, firm 
reorganization, bankruptcy, privatization, dismissal initiated by employer, and personnel 
reduction (items 1 through 6 in Table A1). Our measure of displacement is conservative in 
that we exclude separations due to end of contract or probation time (items 7 and 8). These 
latter two reasons and items 9 through 24 then constitute job quits, so, the estimated 
displacement rates are lower bounds.  
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We can calculate job tenure and work experience over this sample period, but the data do 
not allow us to calculate total work experience since for those who began work before 1998. 
Therefore, we use age as a proxy for total work experience. For the period 1998 to 2003, 
workers leaving or losing a job are asked to give their final salary measured as gross monthly 
wages in Hryvnia. If workers are paid in another currency (e.g. dollars or rubles), they are 
asked to state the currency. Workers starting a new job are asked to give their starting salary. 
All those with a job are asked to give their wages in December of each year. We exclude 
individuals who work abroad. Due to concerns over the reliability of retrospective data in 
periods of hyperinflation and also when the carbovanets was the national currency, we 
exclude the years before 1998 from our wage analysis. Since the official retirement age is 60 
for men and 55 for women, but many work beyond these age limits, we construct measures of 
separations, displacements and quits based on two age intervals in the given year, 15 to 59 
and 15-72.  However, as our measures are not very sensitive to the choice of age interval, we 
present in the main text only figures associated with the statutory retirement age.  
 
3. The Incidence of Displacement 
The top panel of Figure 1 and the last rows of Tables 1 and A2 outline the pattern of 
annual job displacement rates in Ukraine in the year immediately after independence and the 
years 1998 to 2002 when the economy was coming out of a deep and prolonged recession. 
Displacement is relatively low in 1992 but rises to between four and five per cent in the years 
1998 to 2002. These latter figures are broadly comparable with those from the Western 
literature; for example, U.S., Dutch, German and British displacement rates average between 
3 to 6 percent of the workforce in a year (Kuhn, 2002). In the mature stage of transition, 
Estonia had a displacement of 6% (Lehmann, Philips, and Wadsworth, 2005). Hence, Ukraine 
has displacement rates only slightly lower than one of the fast reformers among the transition 
economies. As the central panel of Figure 1 shows, redundancies rather than plant closures 
account for the majority of displacement.  Plant closures reach a peak, at slightly more than 
one fifth of all displacements, in 1998. Bankruptcies, on the other hand, are the least 
important reason for displacement.   
  The incidence of quits is much larger than that of displacements, accounting for 
around two thirds of separations.  Quits grew between 1992 and 2002, reaching 14% of 
employment in the latter year. The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows that voluntary job 
separations and retirements are responsible for the majority of quits throughout the period.  
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 Table 1 shows that men were less likely to experience displacement between 1998 and 
2000 but more likely to do so in the last two years of the sample period. Since 1999, 
Ukrainian workers have experienced less displacement than the rates for ethnic Russian 
workers, which might be related to the larger employment share of ethnic Russians in 
industries most affected by downsizing. Displacement rates are relatively uniform across age 
groups, while displacement does fall disproportionately on less-educated individuals. For 
most of the period, less-skilled workers experience more displacement. The incidence of 
displacement by job tenure shows a U-shaped relationship in 2002, implying that individuals 
relatively new in their job and those with very long tenure are mostly affected by involuntary 
separations. This pattern cannot be observed for earlier years in the data.  The western part of 
Ukraine has far lower displacement rates than the rest of the country throughout the entire 
period.    
Job loss is much lower in the sector “education, health, and social work” throughout the 
period, while displacement in the wholesale and retail trade, hotel and finance sectors remains 
consistently high. The other two industries where displacement is comparatively high in the 
examined years are manufacturing and mining and construction. As far as ownership is 
concerned, it is striking that new private firms have substantially larger displacement rates 
than both state-owned and privatized firms, hinting possibly at learning effects.  It is 
noteworthy that in the early years of the period, worker displacement in the new private sector 
is caused equally by firm exit as well as redundancies while the latter dominates in 2002. So, 
in the early years many of the newly created firms turned out to be non-viable while in 2002 
many of the newly created firms seem to survive but decrease their workforce.  
All survey data on displacement are plagued to some degree by selection bias. If workers 
have rational expectations about the economic viability of their firm, those workers with good 
prospects in the labor market may quit the firm before the firm is closed down or before mass 
layoffs occur. Hence, workers with worse characteristics remain. In restructuring firms that do 
not close down but initiate mass layoffs, the better-quality workers may stay with the firm 
because of potential post-restructuring productivity gains that generate high wage growth.6 
Whether selection problems related to mass layoffs and plant closure are particularly strong in 
transition economies is a contentious issue. Potential failure or poor performance of firms 
may be easier to perceive in a transition economy and, as a result, good workers would be 
more likely to leave the firm before closure or large-scale labor shedding. Conversely, good 
                                                          
6 Pfann (2001) finds workers with higher expected productivity growth are the “better quality” workers retained 
by the firm. In a transition context, such workers might want to stay in restructuring firms.  
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workers may have more reason to retain their old job in restructuring firms because of the 
prospect of higher future rewards after restructuring. Workers may also keep their jobs 
because of greater uncertainty in a rapidly changing transition labor market or because of poor 
outside options, which both characterize the situation in the Ukrainian labor market 
throughout the sample period.  Since we are unable to discern which of these scenarios 
prevails, we allow for the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity in the estimates of jobless 
duration and the cost of job loss.  
If an exogenous shock affects all sectors equally, displaced workers would not be 
different from other workers. However, Tables 1 and A2 suggest that displacement is non-
random across observable characteristics. Multinomial logit estimates of relative displacement 
probabilities shown in Table 2 for the periods 1992 to 1997 and 1998 to 2002 confirm this. 
The marginal effects are not directly comparable across the two periods, since the 
construction of the data allows the estimation of annual probabilities only for the latter period, 
while we can estimate the probability of being displaced or of quitting at any point in time in 
the interval 1992 to 1997.  
For the earlier period, female workers have a probability of being displaced that is 2.3 
percentage points higher throughout the early period and 0.5 percentage points in the years 
1998 to 2002.  Once we control for industry, there is no longer a difference in the probability 
of being displaced between Ukrainian and Russian workers although the propensity to quit is 
lower among Ukrainians in the years 1992 to 1997. Also, job losers have a relatively uniform 
age profile while job quitters are concentrated in the youngest and oldest age groups in the 
latter period and among the oldest age group in the earlier period. Educational background, on 
the other hand does not seem to matter as far as job loss is concerned while between 1992 and 
1997 the least educated workers have the highest quit rates. These rates are also not affected 
by educational attainment in the interval 1998 to 2002. In general, low tenure workers are 
more likely to quit.  In the early period, displacement was particularly high for medium term 
tenure, while essentially unaffected by tenure in the years 1998 to 2002.  
The multinomial regressions only partially confirm the effect of ownership type on 
displacement given by the simple cross tabulations, since workers in state-owned firms have 
the same incidence of displacement than workers in newly established firms. On the other 
hand, workers in privatized firms are less affected by displacement than their counterparts 
working in firms with other ownership structures.  
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Workers in manufacturing, construction and retail trade and hotel services seem 
particularly hard hit by displacement throughout the years 1992 to 2002. In contrast, 
educators, health and social workers as well as workers in transport seem less affected by 
displacement, with workers in education, health and social work having a lower probability of 
3 points per annum in the second time interval.  One plausible implication of these findings is 
that the latter industry did not undergo any major restructuring effort throughout the period. 
Firm size is not an important predictor as far as both displacement and voluntary quitting are 
concerned. In contrast, and this is the most striking results of the multinomial regressions, 
throughout the entire sample period, workers in Kyiv city have a higher incidence of being 
displaced and much larger propensities to quit than workers in other parts of the country. 
  These results make clear that the high raw displacement rates of workers in the new 
private sector are at least partially linked to a composition rather than an ownership effect. 
Calculations, which are not reported here, show that about two thirds of all employment in 
new private firms is concentrated in the sectors industry, construction and wholesale/ retail 
trade/hotels and restaurants and that a large part of employment in new private firms is 
located in Kyiv city.   
In summary, throughout the period, industry affiliation, job characteristics, and 
geographic location rather than personal characteristics were the main determinants of 
closures and permanent layoffs. In the next two sections, we outline the possible costs of job 
loss in Ukraine and investigate to what extent these costs have changed over time.  
 
4. The Cost of Job Displacement in Ukraine: Duration of Joblessness  
Job loss involves both a risk of non-employment and a possibility of lower wages for 
those workers who find new employment.  We first report the cumulative return rates to 
employment, conditional on non-employment duration, of displaced workers and compare 
these to return rates of quits for the two periods.7  The rates in Table 3 are based on the 
complement of the Kaplan-Meier estimator of survivor functions (Smith, 2002) in non-
employment. In the years 1992 to 1997 only a small fraction of both displaced workers and 
workers who separated voluntarily get back into employment immediately through a job-to-
job move. However, most of the 43 percent of the displaced who return to work within a year 
do so during the first three months. It is striking that less than half of all workers who 
                                                          
7 We now remove early retirements from the job quit sample because their return to work probabilities are very 
low. 
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separated from a job find reemployment after one year, leading to a large incidence of long-
term non-employment among these workers.  
During the recovery period between 1998 and 2002, around about one-third of  
workers returned to work through a job-to-job move after having been displaced, while only 
an additional 13 percentage points return to work within a year. Kuhn (2002) finds that two-
thirds of displaced workers in the United States are re-employed within six months. In Britain, 
half of the displaced workers return within two months. By western standards, Ukrainian 
displaced workers have low return rates. While a minority of workers find reemployment after 
a very brief spell of non-employment, a majority of workers lingers on in non-employment 
for a very long time. In general, workers who separated voluntarily have return rates that are 
roughly 10 percentage points higher at each spell length. Finally, the median duration of 
completed spells, which stays at 1 month for the latter period, also demonstrates that in the 
interval of 1998 to 2002 most who return to work do so nearly immediately after having 
separated from their previous job.  The Ukrainian hazards are similar to those found in 
Estonia by Lehmann, Philips, and Wadsworth, (2005) and could therefore suggest that these 
return rate patterns could well characterize the experience of displaced workers under 
transition. 
These results have two clear consequences. First, the Ukrainian labor market cannot 
be characterized as dynamic as implied in the study by Boeri and Terrell (2002). Second, one 
possible source of adverse selection in analyzing a pool of displaced workers may be of some 
concern for our sample of Ukrainian workers.  
The Kaplan-Meier estimates of these rates over the sample period are given in Figure 
2 confirm the findings of Table 3.8 In the early years of the sample, hazard rates into 
employment are high during the first two months of a jobless spell. Thereafter, the hazard 
rates fall dramatically and stay uniformly low. In the later years of the sample, the hazard 
rates fall precipitously after the first month. The hazard rates for displaced workers are 
generally not statistically different from those of quits at spell lengths other than job-to-job 
moves. 
These data suggest that around a third of all displaced workers find a new job 
relatively rapidly, while the other two thirds have difficulty moving back into work. 
Unemployment benefits and related welfare payments are low and often not paid in most 
                                                          
8  The standard errors for these hazard rate estimates are in the order of 0.001 to 0.002. 
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regions of Ukraine.9  Hence, any incentive problems associated with the benefit system are 
unlikely to explain this flat hazard rate after two months. Figure 2 shows no obvious spikes in 
the hazard rates around the time of benefit exhaustion, which for the maximum benefit is 
given after 12 months of unemployment. Rather, a third of the displaced workers with 
presumably appropriate characteristics are re-employed rapidly, while those unable to move 
into employment quickly incur large income losses.  However, any implied income losses 
would be exaggerated if individuals work in the informal sector, which is estimated to be 
substantial in Ukraine.10     
We model the hazard rates and the determinants parametrically using the 
complementary log-log model suggested in the literature, e.g. Jenkins (2003), when the 
underlying spell data are intrinsically continuous but the researcher observes only that the 
spell length falls within a discrete interval. In this case, the discrete-time hazard rate for 
individual i at time t endowed with a set of characteristics X, can be written as:   
hi(j, X) = 1 – exp[exp(β’X + γt )], where γt summarizes the pattern of duration dependence in 
the discrete-time hazard function. We model this duration dependence flexibly by introducing 
a piecewise constant, which in practice amounts to the addition of 3 dummy variables for the 
first 6 months of any jobless spell.11  
The X vector contains a set of individual characteristics that might be expected to 
influence the opportunity cost of not working in addition to a set of characteristics of the job 
from which the worker was displaced. The presence of unobserved individual specific 
characteristics that affect the return to employment would, of course, lead to biased estimates 
of the parameters of these exit rates. If the unobserved heterogeneity, v, is distributed 
independently of any observed X variable, it can be integrated out by assuming a functional 
form that can be summarized in a few parameters. For this, we use a Gamma-distributed 
parametric function and allow for right censoring of any spells. To focus on the comparative 
aspects of displacement, we exclude those who leave a job for retirement from the sample of 
quits.  For the two periods, we pool the non-employment spell data and estimate discrete-
time, proportional hazard functions for displaced workers and quits in Table 4. We also 
present additional hazard rate estimates, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity, in Table A3 in 
                                                          
9 The Ukrainian unemployment benefit system is earnings-related; in Kyiv, where average wages are much 
higher that in the rest of the country, benefit payments can on average be quite generous. Such generosity is 
absent in the rest of the country.   
10 Lehmann, Kupets, and Pignatti (2005) estimate that between 27 and 33 percent of the unemployed are engaged 
in informal activities in the latter sample period. 
11 Additional dummy variables for the periods beyond 6 months were not significant in both time periods. 
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the appendix. With the unobserved heterogeneity parameters insignificant in all regressions of 
Table 4, the results in Tables 4 and A3 are broadly comparable.  
In contrast to the findings in Table 2 concerning the incidence of job loss, the 
estimates in Table 4 suggest that not only job attributes of previous employment but also 
individual characteristics are important determinants of the return to work hazard rate. Female 
workers have substantially lower return rates. Workers with university education have 
substantially higher hazard rates throughout the decade, regardless of whether they are 
displaced or quit. It is noteworthy that ethnicity has no explanatory power with respect to the 
hazard from non-employment. 
Importantly, job tenure does influence the hazard rate in the earlier period, as 
displaced workers having job tenure of medium length in the old job return to work earlier. 
This tenure effect is no longer present in the second period. Those with previous employment 
in manufacturing, retail and education and health return to work earlier than those who 
worked in agriculture in the latter period. It is striking that in both periods regional location 
does not seem to affect outflows from non-employment whether we deal with displaced 
workers or those who quit. The duration dependence parameters confirm the pattern of the 
Kaplan-Meier estimates; the probability of finding work within the first three months of any 
jobless spell is high but the hazard rate is low thereafter. In the latter period, this return to 
work probability is significantly higher only within the first month of any jobless spell.  
 
5. The Earnings Cost of Job Displacement in Ukraine 
We begin by examining re-entry wages for displaced workers. Table 5 gives estimates 
of the determinants of the log of the new real wage and of the change in the log of real wages 
for displaced workers who find a new full-time job conditional on observed individual 
characteristics and the characteristics of the old job.12 We obtain wages from the job history 
data in the ULMS from the December of each year from 1997 to 2002.  Since we have shown 
that less than one third of displaced workers return to work during the sample interval, 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of these wage determinants based only on the sub-
sample of returnees may be subject to selectivity bias. The effects of the independent 
variables on the wages of those not yet re-employed may differ from the effects on those who 
return to work. To address this issue, we contrast OLS estimates with those based on the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the selection bias correction model of Heckman (1979). 
The selection equations and sample means of the covariates for the two sub-samples of 
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displaced returnees and non-returnees are given in Table A4 of the Appendix. The selection 
equations are identified by controls for the number of children, which are also used by 
Podgursky and Swaim (1987), marital status, and reliance on land to produce food in the year 
prior to displacement. These variables are used also in Table 4 and are assumed to affect both 
the opportunity cost and the probability of return to work, but not the wage offered.  
Column 1 of Table 4 indicates that wage premia were paid to men, workers with 
higher vocational and university education, those with jobs in the capital and workers in large 
establishments. In the Western literature, industry-specific human capital is considered to be 
important for maintaining previous wage levels in new jobs (Neal, 1995). Hence, changing 
industry should result in a wage penalty. This hypothesis is clearly supported by the data. In 
addition, a significant wage penalty accrues to those who were out of work for more than one 
month.  On the other hand, the ownership type of the firm in the old job does not appear to 
affect wages on return to work. There is however a significant premium for those workers 
who changed regions after displacement, probably reflecting higher wages on offer in the 
capital city. Note that there is no reward to seniority (age) in the new jobs filled by displaced 
workers. A wage penalty for previously working in agriculture and a premium for having 
worked in firms with more than 100 employees are the only additional noteworthy results in 
column 1. 
In contrast to Lehmann, Philips, and Wadsworth (2005), using Estonia data, but in line 
with Orazem et al. (2004) for Slovenia, the selection terms are positive.13 This indicates that 
workers who could potentially command higher wages are more likely to be found back at 
work and may point to the nature of job creation at this stage of the transition process in the 
Ukraine. The coefficient estimates of the Heckman correction model in column 2 are however 
broadly similar to the OLS estimates. In columns 3 and 4 we add the last wage observed in 
the job before displacement to the vector of controls as an additional control for individual 
heterogeneity and also to investigate whether regression to the mean in wages occurs among 
displaced workers.14 The coefficients on the last wage are highly significant and all 
coefficients are less than one, indicating that workers who were relatively highly paid before 
displacement experience higher proportionate wage losses if they return to work. The addition 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12  Results for wage changes of those who quit and found a new job are available on request. 
13 The selection terms are given by the coefficients on Lambda. These coefficients represent the correlation 
coefficient between the error term of the wage equation and the error term of the selection equation. Verbeek 
(2000) provides a lucid discussion of the basic Heckman selection model. 
14  See for example Podgursky and Swaim (1987). If LnWti = b1 LnWt-1i + b2 Zt-1i , then the proportional change 
in wages due to displacement, Ln(Wti/ Wt-1i) = (b1 -1)LnWt-1i + b2 Zt-1i, . Hence the coefficient on the last wage 
measures the extent to which future wage changes depend on past earnings. 
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of the selection controls also raises the significance of the job tenure variables which suggest 
that high tenured workers suffer greater relative wage loss on a return to work. 
When the last wage is included, the size of many of the individual and job coefficients 
are reduced because the effect of many of these variables is absorbed by previous earnings. 
However, the significance of the effects is unaltered. In columns 5 and 6, we examine the 
change in wages by imposing a coefficient of 1 on lagged wages and removing any 
unobserved individual fixed effects that may determine wage levels. There are significant 
effects of education, firm size, tenure, industry change and change of region on wage changes.    
The results of Table 5 do not capture any earnings loss due to displacement. To 
evaluate whether wage loss is a significant aspect of displacement in the Ukraine, we must 
compare the wage in the new job with its counterfactual, i.e. the wage that would have 
prevailed if the worker had not been displaced and had remained in the original job. 
Therefore, we next construct difference-in-difference estimators, comparing the 2 year change 
in the log of monthly wages of workers who those who remain in work with the two-year 
change for displaced workers.  The class of these estimators can be written as follows: 
 
or (1) 
(2) 
 
where w1 and w2 are wages in the first and second period, and X is a vector of conditioning 
variables. The variable d takes a value of one in the treatment case, i.e., displacement and zero 
in the no-treatment case, i.e., the worker remains in the job.  If E(w1 | X;d=0) = E(w1 | X;d=1) 
in equation (2), i.e. if the conditional expectation of the wage before displacement were the 
same for displaced workers and those who remain, the effect of displacement on earnings 
would be given by the first two terms in equation (2). Therefore, the earnings loss would be 
identified by this difference-in-differences estimator. 15  
The sample of displaced workers with wages observed before and after displacement 
is rather small. Of the 1362 workers in our sample who were displaced sometime between 
December 1997 and December 2002, 262 are observed with wages in the December before 
and the December after displacement, (reflecting the low rates of return to employment of 
displaced workers observed in Table 5), and 168 are observed with wages in all 6 consecutive 
years. 
                                                          
15 See Manski (1995) for a lucid discussion of identification. 
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Table 6 outlines the results of the difference-in-differences exercise. The results in 
Table 5 suggest that unobservable factors may determine re-entry wages for displaced 
workers. This indicates a classic self-selection problem and E(w2 | X;d=1) could be biased. 
However, differencing the wage removes any unobservable fixed effects that influence wage 
levels, although any selection effects on wage changes remain. If the latter are important, our 
results apply only to the subset of displaced workers who return to work.  Given these caveats, 
the results of Table 6 suggest that there is no short-run wage penalty to displacement. The 
difference-in-differences estimator (the interaction of the displacement dummy and the 
second period time dummy) is always insignificantly different from zero.16 When the 
displacement dummy is replaced by the spell length in panel B, the difference in difference 
estimates of the effects of spell length are negative but not statistically significant. 
To measure the longer-term wage costs of displacement we follow the standard 
methodology in the literature (for example Jacobsen et al. (1993) or Stevens (1997)) 
comparing wages of displaced workers with those of a control group of workers who are not 
displaced from their jobs over the same period, and estimate equations of the form 
LnWit = Xitβ + Zitγ + Σ-1 Dkitδk + ai + uit  
Where Xit is a set of fixed and time varying individual controls, Zit is a set of job 
characteristics that may influence both wage levels and displacement probabilities.  The 
model also contains a set of year-specific dummy variables to capture aggregate movements 
in real wage levels. 
Given the relatively short span of our data, the set of Dit dummy variables indicate job 
displacement in the preceding two, current or next two years. The δk coefficients on the 
dummies are the estimated differences in wages between displaced workers and those who 
remain measured k years before or after displacement.  If the identification condition for the 
difference in differences estimate is satisfied, the coefficients should not be significantly 
different from each other over the various years before displacement because differences 
would indicate diverging wage growth between displaced workers and those who remain. The 
dummy variable of the period in which displacement occurs picks out the immediate effect of 
displacement on the return-to work wage relative to job stayers. The (two) dummy variables 
for the years after displacement will pick up any persistence in displacement effects.  To 
control for any unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity on wage levels we employ 
standard fixed and random effects estimation strategies. 
                                                          
16 Real wages are falling over the sample period, hence the significant negative term on the second period time 
dummy. 
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The top panel of Table 7 indicates that there are no wage costs of displacement for this 
sub-sample of displaced workers. The mean wage change for this sample of displaced 
workers (panel A), when benchmarked against stayers is nearly always positive and between 
2 and 4 log points, whether or not unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for, but none of the 
point estimates are statistically different from zero. Using before and after displacement 
dummy variables, (panel B), there is some suggestion that wages may begin to fall in the year 
prior to displacement and that this loss is not recovered in the first year after the return to 
work in a new job, though the after displacement effects are often only significant at  the 10% 
level. 
 
6. Conclusion   
 Using Ukrainian household survey data we establish for the first time the extent and 
the cost of job loss in a labor market of a CIS economy. We estimate that displacement rates 
over the last decade were between 2.7 and 4.9 percent, indicating that Ukrainian firms have 
been laying off workers permanently at rates comparable to those in mature market 
economies. These estimates contradict the frequently held notion that involuntary separations 
are unimportant in CIS labor markets because of low labor costs.  
Multinomial regressions show that displacement is not entirely random. Female 
workers have a higher probability of being displaced than men.  Job losers are typically older 
workers compared with job quitters, although their educational backgrounds are similar. 
Educational attainment does not seem to affect displacement throughout the entire period, 
though. Displacement was particularly high for medium term tenure over the whole sample 
period.  Demographic and job characteristics in previous employment are, however, not the 
main factors that drive displacement. Instead industry affiliation, ownership type and region 
matter more. Workers in industry, construction and wholesale and retail trade and hotel 
services were particularly hard hit by displacement throughout the years 1992 to 2002. In 
addition, persons residing in Kyiv city are disproportionately affected by permanent layoffs. 
Once industry, size and regional controls are included a causal effect of ownership type on 
displacement can only be established for privatized firms, where workers have a slightly 
lower displacement incidence.     
  By the standards of industrialized economies, Ukrainian displaced workers have 
extremely low return rates. While a minority of workers finds reemployment after a very brief 
spell of non-employment, the majority of workers linger on in non-employment for a very 
long time. Consequently, the Ukrainian unemployment pool cannot be characterized as 
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dynamic as mooted by some. While the individual costs in terms of non-employment spells 
are large in Ukraine, wage losses due to displacement are rather limited. For those who return 
to work, there is evidence of a small fall in wages one year prior to displacement, and that this 
loss is not recovered in the first year after the return to work in a new job. Our analysis makes 
it clear that the main cost for displaced workers in Ukraine consists in the extremely long non-
employment spell that the average worker experiences after layoff. It is this group of workers 
lingering on in long-term unemployment that Ukrainian policy makers should focus their 
attention on.  
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Figure 1. Ukrainian Worker Separation Rates by Year 
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Figure 2. Hazard Rates for Displaced Workers and Job Quits n the Ukraine: 1997-2002 
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 Table 1. Job Displacement Rates (in percent), 1992-2002:Working age 15-59 
 1992 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Males 3.3 4.5 3.8 4.5 3.6 5.5 
Females 2.2 5.2 4.3 4.6 3.4 3.6 
Ukrainian 2.6 4.9 3.8 4.3 3.4 4.4 
Russian 2.8 4.3 5.4 5.1 4.0 4.9 
Other 3.3 8.6 3.4 7.7 1.5 5.6 
Age       
15-24 4.4 5.3 5.3 4.6 3.1 5.3 
25-39 3.1 5.5 4.0 4.1 3.6 3.6 
40-54 1.9 4.7 4.0 5.2 3.5 4.9 
55+ 1.9 3.0 3.6 2.7 2.9 5.7 
Education       
Grades 1-11 2.4 5.2 4.7 7.6 2.8 3.7 
General secondary 3.5 5.5 4.7 5.5 4.3 6.0 
Vocational elementary 2.7 4.6 3.5 4.0 4.9 5.8 
Vocational secondary 3.0 4.3 5.2 3.2 2.9 5.5 
Professional secondary/Incomplete higher 2.3 4.8 4.3 4.5 3.8 3.4 
University 2.5 4.3 1.6 3.2 2.3 3.5 
Job tenure       
 <1 Year 2.8 - 4.3 3.5 3.4 5.7 
1Year 3.6 5.4 5.3 4.9 4.2 4.7 
2-5Years 3.7 7.1 3.9 4.7 2.3 3.8 
6-10 Years 2.5 6.6 4.4 4.6 5.3 3.4 
11 Years + 2.0 3.3 3.8 4.7 3.2 5.1 
Occupation       
Legislators, Senior Managers, Officials  1.4 3.2 3.6 2.1 5.2 2.1 
Professionals 1.9 2.9 2.4 3.0 1.4 2.5 
Technicians and Associate Professionals  1.9 5.9 2.2 3.4 2.6 2.7 
Clerks 2.2 7.7 5.8 3.5 4.4 6.4 
Service Workers and Market Workers 3.7 5.9 6.7 5.4 1.4 4.9 
Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers - 6.6 5.0 11.5 1.5 8.2 
Craft and Related Trades 4.5 5.4 5.2 5.1 4.0 5.9 
Plant and Machine Operators  1.5 4.0 2.8 4.4 5.1 7.1 
Elementary (Unskilled) Occupations 2.4 5.2 2.6 5.7 3.7 5.5 
Industry       
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  1.2 3.2 0.2 8.3 4.1 4.5 
Manufacturing and mining 3.4 5.1 4.6 5.6 4.7 6.7 
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.2 2.6 - - 1.7 4.4 
Construction 3.6 11.0 6.9 6.2 3.2 6.2 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels 5.2 10.1 7.8 6.4 4.4 5.8 
Transport, storage and communication 0.7 5.4 3.6 2.0 2.4 5.3 
Financial intermediation, real estate 5.1 9.2 4.2 1.4 6.9 6.2 
Public Administration and defense 3.2 2.5 2.1 4.6 4.6 2.4 
Education, health and social work  1.3 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.3 1.0 
Social and personal service activities 4.3 5.5 6.7 1.6 4.6 2.7 
Other activities  - 6.5 3.5 3.5 - 3.6 
Type of enterprise/organization       
State 2.6 4.4 3.8 4.7 3.7 4.9 
Cooperative 7.3 14.0 7.1 2.0 2.1 - 
Newly established enterprise - 8.7 5.9 6.9 4.0 5.3 
Privatized enterprise 4.9 5.4 4.4 3.4 3.3 4.4 
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Region       
West 1.1 2.7 1.4 2.5 1.7 1.5 
Kyiv City 2.6 5.5 3.6 2.8 5.9 3.7 
Center & North 0.8 3.9 2.2 2.9 2.5 4.3 
East 1.4 3.2 2.8 3.2 2.5 3.6 
South 1.7 3.7 5.2 4.0 2.5 3.8 
      
 Total  2.7 4.9 4.1 4.5 3.5 4.5 
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Table 2. Displacement and Quits: Multinomial Logit Estimation 1992 to 2002  
 1992-1997  1998-2002 
 Displaced Quit  Displaced Quit 
Female 0.023 
(0.010)* 
0.041 
(0.015)* 
 0.005 
(0.003)* 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Age 16-24 -0.044 
(0.018)* 
-0.151 
(0.025)* 
 0.004 
(0.005) 
0.061 
(0.011)* 
Age 25-34 -0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.192 
(0.017)* 
 -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
Age 35-44 0.024 
(0.013) 
-0.233 
(0.015)* 
 0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.023 
(0.005)* 
Ethnicity      
Ukrainian 0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.099 
(0.037)* 
 -0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.0005 
(0.011) 
Russian 0.026 
(0.029) 
-0.073 
(0.035)* 
 -0.004 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
Education      
General Secondary  0.031 
(0.016) 
-0.068 
(0.020)* 
 0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.006) 
Vocational 
Elementary 
0.011 
(0.023) 
-0.056 
(0.030) 
 -0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
Vocational 
Secondary 
0.029 
(0.019) 
-0.046 
(0.024) 
 -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Professional 
/Incomplete Higher  
0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.075 
(0.020)* 
 0.0002 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
University 0.010 
(0.018) 
-0.115 
(0.022)* 
 -0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Tenure      
<1 year -0.016 
(0.021) 
0.242 
(0.035)* 
 -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.035 
(0.010)* 
1 year 0.059 
(0.024)* 
0.097 
(0.032)* 
 0.008 
(0.005) 
0.058 
(0.011)* 
2 to 5 years 0.038 
(0.015)* 
0.097 
(0.021)* 
 0.006 
(0.004) 
0.031 
(0.007)* 
6 to 10 years 0.027 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
 0.016 
(0.005)* 
0.024 
(0.007)* 
Ownership      
New enterprise -0.034 
(0.032) 
-0.118 
(0.051)* 
 -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
Cooperative 0.122 
(0.048)* 
0.057 
(0.059) 
 0.001 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.019) 
Privatized enterprise -0.046 
(0.014)* 
-0.206 
(0.022)* 
 -0.007 
(0.003)* 
-0.018 
(0.005)* 
Industry      
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Agriculture -0.077 
(0.012)* 
0.019 
(0.025) 
 -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
Energy  -0.078 
(0.021)* 
-0.016 
(0.054) 
 -0.021 
(0.004)* 
-0.029 
(0.010)* 
Construction -0.015 
(0.019) 
0.121 
(0.037)* 
 0.009 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
Retail 0.030 
(0.021) 
0.096 
(0.034)* 
 0.006 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Transport -0.077 
(0.013)* 
0.017 
(0.030) 
 -0.011 
(0.004)* 
-0.015 
(0.007)* 
Financial -0.038 
(0.030) 
-0.068 
(0.058) 
 -0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
Public 
Administration  
-0.017 
(0.020) 
0.053 
(0.038) 
 -0.014 
(0.004)* 
-0.024 
(0.008)* 
Education, health  -0.099 
(0.011)* 
-0.017 
(0.026) 
 -0.031 
(0.003)* 
-0.040 
(0.006)* 
Other service -0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.001 
(0.036) 
 -0.009 
(0.004)* 
0.001 
(0.009) 
Other activities -0.002 
(0.064) 
-0.025 
(0.114) 
 -0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.019) 
Firm size      
100-249 0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.028 
(0.023) 
 -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
250-499 -0.010 
(0.017) 
0.034 
(0.026) 
 0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.007) 
500-999 0.013 
(0.019) 
0.049 
(0.028) 
 0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.021 
(0.007)* 
1000+ -0.005 
(0.014) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
 -0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Region      
West -0.046 
(0.013)* 
-0.225 
(0.018)* 
 -0.038 
(0.002)* 
-0.086 
(0.003)* 
East -0.049 
(0.012)* 
-0.215 
(0.018)* 
 -0.039 
(0.003)* 
-0.096 
(0.004)* 
Center and North -0.057 
(0.012)* 
-0.225 
(0.018)* 
 -0.034 
(0.002)* 
-0.088 
(0.004)* 
South -0.048 
(0.013)* 
-0.218 
(0.018)* 
 -0.028 
(0.002)* 
-0.085 
(0.003)* 
N 
Pseudo R2 
4977 
0.0990 
  19224 
0.1013 
 
Source: ULMS  Notes: coefficients are marginal effects. Clustered standard errors in brackets. * statistically significant at the 
5% level;  Default categories are male, age 45-60, other nationality, grade 1 to 11, tenure >10  years, previously working in 
state owned firm , production sector,  firm>1000 employees, Kyiv city. Full-time jobs only. 
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Table 3. Cumulative Return Rates for Job Movers: 1992 to 2002 
 1992-1997  1998-2002 
% returning Displaced Quit  Displaced Quit 
<1 month (job to job) 6.7 8.6  32.2 44.3 
<3 months 31.5 40.6  33.6 46.3 
<6 months 38.6 43.4  39.1 51.2 
<=12 months 42.6 47.1  44.7 57.2 
      
Median completed 
duration (months) 
5 3  1 1 
Median number of spells 1 1  1 1 
      
N 434 1169  862 1714 
Source: ULMS.  Notes ( i) The fractions are based on one minus the Kaplan-Meier survivor function. (ii) Retirements 
are excluded from quits.  
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Table 4. Discrete Piecewise Proportional Hazard Estimates of Jobless Spell Excluding 
Movements into Retirement (Gamma Unobserved Heterogeneity) 
 1992-97 1998-2002 
 Displaced Quit Displaced Quit 
Individual     
Age 16-24 0.509 0.701 0.522 0.156 
 (0.300) (0.217)* (0.212)* (0.139)   
Age 25-34 0.201 0.743 0.335 0.144 
 (0.183) (0.195)* (0.168)* (0.127) 
Age 35-44 0.132 0.839 0.343 0.223 
 (0.163) (0.129)* (0.151)* (0.128) 
Female -0.252 -1.097 -0.781 -0.735 
 (0.205) (0.217)* (0.203)* (0.143)* 
Kids 0.489 -0.024 -0.037 0.146 
 (0.213)* (0.177) (0.164) (0.122) 
Female*Kids -0.045 0.385 0.296 0.118 
 (0.234) (0.228) (0.216) (0.156) 
Married -0.400 0.051 -0.064 -0.030 
 (0.152)* (0.129) (0.124) (0.092) 
Ukrainian -0.170 -0.047 0.200 -0.064 
 (0.138) (0.124) (0.125) (0.092) 
Education     
0.119 0.047 0.128 0.233 Professional/Incomplete  
Higher (0.138) (0.128) (0.126) (0.105)* 
University 0.150 0.735 0.473 0.522 
 (0.156) (0.162)* (0.164)* (0.119)* 
     
Works Land Plot -0.102 -0.036 0.003 -0.095 
 (0.116) (0.107) (0.112) (0.082) 
Job     
Tenure <1 year -1.051 -0.750 -0.193 -0.249 
 (0.566) (0.346)* (0.202) (0.146) 
Tenure 1-5 years 0.099 -0.387 -0.065 -0.067 
 (0.167) (0.169)* (0.161) (0.121) 
Tenure 5-10 years 0.299 -0.081 0.132 0.183 
 (0.152)* (0.141) (0.156) (0.128) 
Firm Size 1000+ 0.070 -0.124 -0.070 -0.131 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.153) (0.117) 
Industry     
Manufacturing 1.010 1.156 0.464 0.505 
 (0.182)* (0.170)* (0.148)* (0.116)* 
Retail 1.026 0.927 0.648 0.452 
 (0.227)* (0.169)* (0.188)* (0.128)* 
Transport 0.924 0.752 0.400 0.640 
 (0.303)* (0.245)* (0.242) (0.206)* 
Finance 1.787 0.428 0.561 0.410 
 (0.413)* (0.377) (0.354) (0.261) 
Education&Health 1.324 1.215 0.651 0.624 
 (0.246)* (0.191)* (0.224)* (0.137)* 
Ownership     
New Private 0.482 0.020 -0.053 0.024 
 (0.411) (0.368) (0.163) (0.117) 
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Privatised/Foreign -0.720 -0.507 0.106 -0.015 
 (0.497) (0.337) (0.204) (0.133) 
Region     
Central/North 0.001 -0.007 -0.389  0.003 
 (0.156) (0.169) (0.151)* (0.111) 
Kyiv -0.334 0.052 0.201 0.291 
 (0.239) (0.204) (0.214) (0.151) 
South -0.062 0.162 0.086 -0.019 
 (0.198) (0.171) (0.164) (0.128) 
West -0.210 -0.094 -0.217 -0.205 
 (0.162) (0.168) (0.162) (0.122) 
Duration     
<1 month 1.569 0.957 2.830 3.040 
 (0.364)* (0.294)* (0.199)* (0.165)* 
1-3 months 2.326 2.178 -0.192 0.050 
 (0.198)* (0.149)* (0.251) (0.183) 
3-6 months 0.771 -0.169 0.194 0.304 
 (0.234)* (0.230) (0.220) (0.169) 
     
Constant -4.797 -3.942 -4.235 -4.020 
 (0.332)* (0.357)* (0.291)* (0.245)* 
     
Ln(σ2gamma) -2.934 -0.374 -2.668 -1.878 
 (5.208) (0.348) (3.886) (1.247) 
     
Log L -1668 -3188 -1565 -2568 
Source: ULMS Note: Standard errors in brackets. *  significant at 5% level. Default categories are male aged 45-60, 
single, no children, previously working in state owned firm ,  living in eastern Ukraine, production sector, firm<100 
employees, previous job tenure 10 years +, out of work 6months+. Full-time jobs only. Dummy variable for missing 
values on firm size included. 
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Table 5. After-Displacement Wage Determinants: 1998-2002 
 Ln wage Ln wage ∆Ln wage 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Individual       
Age 16-24 -0.003  0.026  0.014  0.099  0.045  0.116 
 (0.136) (0.165) (0.129) (0.151) (0.154) (0.189) 
Age 25-34 -0.052  0.116 -0.027 0.164  0.018 0.201 
 (0.088) (0.109) (0.084) (0.101) (0.115) (0.136) 
Age 35-44 0.001 0.078 -0.009 0.116 -0.024 0.068 
 (0.084) (0.097) (0.082) (0.092) (0.104) (0.112) 
Female -0.337 -0.407 -0.175 -0.225 0.119 0.025 
 (0.070)* (0.083)* (0.071)* (0.078)* (0.079) (0.096) 
Single -0.182 -0.205 -0.167 -0.207 -0.137 -0.171 
 (0.086)* (0.105)* (0.082)* (0.095)* (0.103) (0.127) 
Professional/Incomplete 0.201 0.287 0.148 0.214 0.051 0.154 
 (0.077)* (0.088)* (0.071)* (0.078)* (0.089) (0.106) 
University 0.445 0.589 0.358 0.437 0.200 0.372 
 (0.097)* (0.121)* (0.091)* (0.104)* (0.106) (0.139)* 
Region       
Centre & North -0.470 -0.646 -0.297 -0.538 0.017 -0.225 
 (0.131)* (0.156)* (0.119)* (0.136)* (0.139) (0.163) 
East -0.410 -0.388 -0.303 -0.389 -0.101 -0.114 
 (0.116)* (0.137)* (0.106)* (0.119)* (0.121) (0.147) 
South -0.383 -0.404 -0.199 -0.228 0.207 0.111 
 (0.139)* (0.157)* (0.128) (0.145) (0.150) (0.179) 
West -0.223 -0.575 -0.067 -0.204 0.251 -0.122 
 (0.151) (0.195)* (0.133) (0.153) (0.161) (0.189) 
Firm       
Privatised -0.046 -0.094 -0.073 -0.214 -0.094  -0.144 
 (0.139) (0.152) (0.119) (0.132) (0.124) (0.163) 
New Private 0.021 0.039 0.006 0.014 -0.032 -0.073 
 (0.114) (0.117) (0.106) (0.108) (0.120) (0.125) 
Foreign Owned 0.276 0.021 0.180 -0.061 -0.005 -0.336 
 (0.220) (0.295) (0.230) (0.276) (0.332) (0.345) 
Tenure <1 year 0.317 0.410 0.299 0.398 0.266 0.406 
 (0.138)* (0.153)* (0.133)* (0.141)* (0.162) (0.182)* 
Tenure 1-5 years 0.244 0.425 0.208 0.290 0.144 0.395 
 (0.108)* (0.121)* (0.104)* (0.109)* (0.126) (0.139)* 
Tenure 5-10 years 0.110 0.153 0.104 0.103 0.095 0.144 
 (0.097) (0.110) (0.096) (0.102) (0.135) (0.140) 
Industry       
Agriculture -0.198 -0.450 -0.071 -0.194 0.158 -0.030 
 (0.1284 (0.152)* (0.114)   (0.134) (0.132) (0.146) 
Construction 0.069 0.111 0.026 0.082 0.023 0.112 
 (0.130) (0.151) (0.120) (0.131) (0.138) (0.168) 
Retail 0.191 0.217 0.157 0.198 0.058 0.135 
 (0.118) (0.131) (0.113) (0.117) (0.125) (0.138) 
Transport 0.003 0.095 0.052 -0.068 0.098 0.211 
 (0.117) (0.153) (0.115) (0.136) (0.142) (0.177) 
Finance -0.227 -0.039 -0.210 -0.141 -0.296 -0.081 
 (0.165) (0.214) (0.137) (0.161) (0.181) (0.207) 
Public Service 0.213 0.202 0.170 0.129 0.078 0.060 
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 (0.143) (0.204) (0.132) (0.160) (0.166) (0.221) 
Education/Health -0.154 -0.158 -0.040 -0.018 0.149 0.100 
 (0.149) (0.173) (0.150) (0.164) (0.200) (0.210) 
Other Services 0.039 0.135 0.087 0.068 0.072  0.209 
 (0.152) (0.171) (0.153) (0.164) (0.192) (0.211) 
       
Firm_size 100-999 0.172 0.323 0.161 0.293 0.140 0.312 
 (0.093) (0.111)* (0.083)   (0.095)* (0.102) (0.126)* 
Firm Size 1000+ 0.229 0.363 0.168 0.279 0.056 0.215 
 (0.114)* (0.138)* (0.112) (0.122)* (0.142) (0.159) 
       
Change Industry -0.140 -0.225 -0.147  -0.220 -0.161  -0.193 
 (0.067)* (0.073)* (0.062)* (0.063)* (0.072)* (0.067)* 
Change Occupation -0.059 -0.005  0.001 0.021 0.118 0.118 
 (0.067) (0.060) (0.066) (0.056) (0.080) (0.070) 
Change Region 0.351 0.300 0.327 0.320 0.282 0.261 
 (0.138)* (0.128)* (0.124)* (0.100)* (0.152) (0.100)* 
Move to Privatised 0.127 0.198 0.109 0.114 0.074 0.066 
 (0.188) (0.183) (0.191) (0.204) (0.240) (0.221) 
-0.001  0.081  0.034 0.128 0.096 0.259 Move to foreign-owned 
(0.194) (0.140) (0.145) (0.121) (0.134) (0.141) 
Time Out       
Job-to-Job 0.183 0.163 0.136 0.133 0.051 0.008 
 (0.073)* (0.060)* (0.069)* (0.058)* (0.085) (0.075) 
1-5 months 0.037 0.062 0.012 0.036 -0.033 -0.135 
 (0.129) (0.116) (0.126) (0.113) (0.152) (0.128) 
       
Ln(old_wage)   0.355 0.440   
   (0.058)* (0.069)*   
       
Lambda   0.698   0.561   0.772 
  (0.112)*  (0.069)*  (0.139)* 
       
Constant 4.839 3.731 3.023 2.141 -0.268 -1.459 
 (0.178)* (0.283)* (0.354)* (0.427)* (0.204) (0.341)* 
       
R2 0.42  0.48  0.18  
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 5 %. Default categories are male aged 45-60, single, no children, 
previously working in state owned firm ,  living in eastern Ukraine, production sector, firm<100 employees, previous 
job tenure 10 years +, out of work 6months+. Full-time jobs only. Dummy variable for missing values on firm size 
included. Sample size 263 
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Table 6. Difference in Difference Estimates of Wage Costs of Displacement: 1998-2002 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A    
2nd Period Dummy -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Displaced -0.059 -0.102 -0.089 
 (0.051) (0.046)* (0.051) 
Displaced*2nd Period 0.007 0.002 0.049 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.061) 
    
Individual controls No Yes Yes 
Job controls No No Yes 
    
R-squared 0.03 0.19 0.26 
    
Panel B    
    
2nd Period Dummy -0.098 0.002 0.002 
 (0.007)* (0.003) (0.003) 
Spell Length -0.043 -0.028 -0.020 
 (0.040) (0.033) (0.031) 
Spell length*2nd Period -0.107 -0.068 0.024 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.146) 
    
Individual controls No Yes Yes 
Job controls No No Yes 
    
R-squared 0.01 0.19 0.26 
Sample size 9785 9785 9785 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%. Regressions also include year dummies. 
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Table 7. Short-Run and Longer-Term Wage Costs of Displacement: 1998 - 2002 
 OLS Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Panel A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Displaced 0.029 0.042 0.040 -0.026 0.030 0.022 0.029 0.030 0.037 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026) 
          
Individual controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B          
Years Before/After 
Displacement 
         
          
2 years before 0.048 -0.077 -0.061 -0.003 -0.029 -0.027 -0.026 -0.068 -0.059 
 (0.070) (0.039)* (0.038) (0.051) (0.034) (0.033) (0.059) (0.039) (0.038) 
1 year before -0.021 -0.130 -0.115 -0.059 -0.072 -0.069 -0.091 -0.124 -0.117 
 (0.060) (0.034)* (0.033)* (0.047) (0.030)* (0.029)* (0.054) (0.034)* (0.032)* 
Year of Displacement 0.037 -0.063 -0.049 -0.051 -0.065 -0.062 0.060 -0.045 -0.023 
 (0.058) (0.033) (0.032) (0.049) (0.030)* (0.029)* (0.069) (0.036) (0.035) 
1 year after 0.013 -0.071 -0.057 -0.061 -0.062 -0.060 -0.008 -0.075 -0.060 
 (0.065) (0.036)* (0.035) (0.056) (0.033) (0.032) (0.063) (0.036)* (0.035) 
2 years after -0.007 -0.045 -0.033 -0.076 -0.047 -0.046 -0.013 -0.056 -0.041 
 (0.067) (0.039) (0.038) (0.057) (0.036) (0.035) (0.063) (0.039) (0.038) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5% level;  Sample size 7722. Sample restricted to those with 6 continuous wage observations. 
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Appendix  
Table A1.  Reasons for leaving job classification17 
REASON CLASSIFICATION 
1 Closing down of enterprise/organization Displacement 
2 Reorganization of enterprise/organization Displacement 
3 Bankruptcy of enterprise/organization Displacement 
4 Privatization of enterprise/organization Displacement 
5 Dismissal initiated by employer Displacement 
6 Personnel reduction Displacement 
7 Expiring of employment contract Quit 
8 Expiring of probation time Quit 
9 Military service  Quit 
10 Imprisonment Quit 
11 Own illness or injury  Quit 
12 Studies Quit 
13 Retirement Quit 
14 Early retirement Quit 
15 Marriage  Quit 
16 Parental leave  Quit 
17 Need to take care of other members of family  Quit 
18 Change of residence Quit 
19 Wanted/was proposed higher salary  Quit 
20 Wanted/was proposed better working conditions  Quit 
21 Wanted/was proposed more interesting work  Quit 
22 Wanted to start own business Quit 
23 Main job became second job  Quit 
24 End of farming/sole proprietorship  Quit 
25 Other Variable (quit in most cases) 
 
                                                          
17 The ULMS allows the respondent to give multiple answers as to the reasons for a job separation. In cases where this 
occurs, we use the following classification criteria: 
- We ignore displacements caused by expiration of the employment contract (we focus on displacement of workers 
with permanent positions); 
- If any of the answers is closing down of enterprise/organization, the person is displaced 
- If among the answers there is no displacement, priority goes to answers suggesting a voluntary quit (wanted/was 
proposed higher salary, better working conditions, more interesting work, wanted to start own business, studies, 
marriage, parental leave, need to take care of family member) 
- in all the remaining cases priority goes again to causes of displacement (reorganization, bankruptcy, privatization, 
personnel reduction); 
- when we have dismissal initiated by the employer together with any of the causes classified as quit, we have a quit. 
 34
Table A2. Job Displacement Rates (in percent), 1992 to 2002 - Working age 15-70 
 1992 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Males 3.2 4.5 3.7 4.3 3.6 5.2 
Females 2.2 5.2 4.3 4.7 3.3 3.5 
Ukrainian 2.6 4.8 3.7 4.2 3.5 4.2 
Russian 2.8 4.3 5.5 5.2 3.7 4.7 
Other 3.3 8.2 3.8 7.3 1.4 5.4 
Age       
15-24 4.4 5.3 5.3 4.6 3.1 5.3 
25-39 3.1 5.5 4.0 4.1 3.6 3.6 
40-54 1.9 4.7 4.0 5.2 3.5 4.9 
55-64 1.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 2.6 4.4 
65+ - 4.4 3.8 1.5 3.8 1.0 
Education       
Grades 1-11 2.3 5.1 4.6 7.1 2.9 3.5 
General secondary 3.5 5.4 4.5 5.4 4.1 5.8 
Vocational elementary 2.7 4.4 3.3 3.8 4.7 5.5 
Vocational secondary 3.0 4.4 5.1 3.2 3.0 5.4 
Professional secondary/Incomplete higher 2.3 4.7 4.4 4.9 3.8 3.2 
University 2.5 4.4 1.7 3.0 2.2 3.4 
Job tenure       
 <1 Year 2.8 - 4.2 3.4 3.3 5.6 
1Year 3.6 5.3 5.1 4.8 4.1 4.5 
2-5Years 3.7 7.0 3.9 4.7 2.2 3.7 
6-10 Years 2.5 6.4 4.3 4.8 5.4 3.3 
11 Years + 2.0 3.4 3.7 4.6 3.1 4.8 
Occupation       
Legislators, Senior Managers, Officials  1.4 3.0 3.7 2.0 5.6 2.0 
Professionals 1.9 2.9 2.3 3.1 1.5 2.3 
Technicians and Associate Professionals  1.9 5.6 2.1 4.0 2.5 2.5 
Clerks 2.2 7.5 5.7 4.2 4.3 6.1 
Service Workers and Market Workers 3.7 5.7 6.8 5.2 1.4 4.7 
Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers - 6.4 5.7 11.0 1.5 7.9 
Craft and Related Trades 4.5 5.6 5.2 5.0 3.9 6.0 
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers 1.5 4.1 2.7 4.5 4.8 6.7 
Elementary (Unskilled) Occupations 2.3 5.1 2.8 5.8 3.4 5.1 
Industry       
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  1.2 3.0 3.1 7.8 4.0 4.2 
Manufacturing and mining 3.4 5.2 4.6 5.4 4.6 6.5 
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.1 2.5 - 0.8 1.6 4.1 
Construction 3.6 11.0 6.7 6.0 3.6 6.5 
Wholesale and retail trade; hotels 5.2 10.1 7.7 6.5 4.3 5.7 
Transport, storage and communication 0.7 5.1 3.7 1.9 2.3 4.9 
Financial intermediation, real estate 5.1 8.9 4.0 2.6 6.4 5.8 
Public Administration and defense 3.2 2.4 2.6 4.9 4.9 2.3 
Education, health and social work  1.3 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.2 0.9 
Social and personal service activities 4.3 5.3 6.4 1.5 4.4 2.5 
Other activities  - 6.3 3.3 3.3 - 3.3 
Type of enterprise/organization       
State 2.6 4.4 3.7 4.7 3.6 4.7 
Cooperative 7.3 13.5 6.7 1.9 2.0 - 
Newly established enterprise - 8.6 6.0 6.8 4.1 5.2 
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Privatized enterprise 4.9 5.5 4.2 3.6 3.4 4.2 
Region       
West 1.1 2.6 1.4 2.4 1.8 1.4 
Kyiv City 2.6 5.3 3.4 3.0 5.5 3.4 
Center & North 0.8 3.8 2.2 2.8 2.4 4.2 
East 1.3 3.1 2.8 3.2 2.5 3.3 
South 1.6 3.6 4.9 3.9 2.4 3.6 
Total  2.7 4.8 4.0 4.5 3.4 4.3 
Source: ULMS. 
 
 
 
Table A3. Discrete Piecewise Proportional Hazard Estimates of Jobless Spell Excluding 
Movements into Retirement (No Unobserved Heterogeneity) 
 1992-97 1998-2002 
 Total Displaced Quit Total Displaced Quit 
Displaced -0.114   -0.182   
 (0.064)   (0.058)*   
Individual       
Age 16-24 0.422 0.471 0.497 0.303 0.463 0.237 
 (0.127)* (0.250) (0.154)* (0.097)* (0.189)* (0.115)* 
Age 25-34 0.427 0.183 0.519 0.274 0.346 0.260 
 (0.103)* (0.176) (0.133)* (0.087)* (0.152)* (0.108)* 
Age 35-44 0.405 0.118 0.591 0.248 0.291 0.221 
 (0.098)* (0.158) (0.131)* (0.083)* (0.131)* (0.109)* 
Female -0.573 -0.220 -0.710 -0.732 -0.746 -0.702 
 (0.105)* (0.191) (0.130)* (0.084)* (0.152)* (0.102)* 
Kids 0.127 0.491 -0.030 0.092 -0.025 0.150 
 (0.099) (0.186)* (0.122) (0.083) (0.149) (0.101) 
Female*Kids 0.179 -0.026 0.240 0.175 0.318 0.051 
 (0.127) (0.227) (0.156) (0.108) (0.195) (0.132) 
Married -0.081 -0.411 0.089 -0.053 -0.014 -0.054 
 (0.071) (0.123)* (0.091) (0.062) (0.114) (0.074) 
Ukrainian -0.084 -0.204 -0.033 0.050 0.214 -0.034 
 (0.070) (0.134) (0.084) (0.063) (0.113) (0.077) 
Education       
0.055 0.119 0.063 0.172 0.197 0.169 Professional 
secondary   (0.073) (0.133) (0.090) (0.066)* (0.112) (0.082)* 
Graduate 0.417 0.145 0.560 0.469 0.488 0.456 
 (0.083)* (0.151) (0.103)* (0.072)* (0.137)* (0.086)* 
       
Works Land Plot -0.049 -0.097 -0.038 -0.042 0.029 -0.066 
 (0.062) (0.111) (0.076) (0.057) (0.104) (0.069) 
Job       
Tenure <1 year -0.471 -1.013 -0.357 -0.036 -0.077 -0.004 
 (0.201)* (0.464)* (0.228) (0.101) (0.184) (0.123) 
Tenure 1-5 years -0.108 0.138 -0.178 0.070 0.012 0.076 
 (0.086) (0.159) (0.104) (0.083) (0.144) (0.103) 
Tenure 5-10 years 0.052 0.308 -0.032 0.147 0.182 0.125 
 (0.077) (0.131)* (0.097) (0.085) (0.143) (0.108) 
Firm Size 1000+ -0.012 0.065 -0.044 -0.131 -0.068 -0.163 
 (0.070) (0.124) (0.088) (0.081) (0.142) (0.101) 
Industry       
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Manufacturing 0.936 1.007 0.976 0.470 0.538 0.470 
 (0.089)* (0.158)* (0.113)* (0.075)* (0.133)* (0.093)* 
Retail 0.839 0.977 0.786 0.453 0.654 0.339 
 (0.094)* (0.186)* (0.113)* (0.084)* (0.144)* (0.105)* 
Transport 0.829 0.915 0.777 0.418 0.553 0.325 
 (0.133)* (0.237)* (0.167)* (0.130)* (0.212)* (0.168) 
Finance 0.807 1.750 0.478 0.241 0.325 0.174 
 (0.205)* (0.387)* (0.247) (0.185) (0.335) (0.224) 
Education&Health 1.104 1.266 1.026 0.506 0.500 0.498 
 (0.098)* (0.169)* (0.123)* (0.095)* (0.209)* (0.109)* 
Ownership       
New Private 0.117 0.455 0.037 0.055 -0.006 0.085 
 (0.204) (0.390) (0.246) (0.080) (0.145) (0.098) 
Privatised/Foreign -0.402 -0.724 -0.370 -0.059 -0.033 -0.068 
 (0.213) (0.473) (0.242) (0.096) (0.193) (0.112) 
Region       
Central/North -0.029 -0.012 -0.045 -0.124 -0.390 0.008 
 (0.090) (0.150) (0.116) (0.078) (0.140)* (0.095) 
Kyiv 0.004 -0.362 0.068 0.272 0.315 0.250 
 (0.116) (0.226) (0.137) (0.099)* (0.188) (0.119)* 
South 0.066 -0.008 0.095 0.040 0.083 -0.026 
 (0.093) (0.172) (0.114) (0.084) (0.141) (0.107) 
West -0.126 -0.223 -0.063 -0.230 -0.259 -0.230 
 (0.091) (0.151) (0.118) (0.085)* (0.151) (0.104)* 
Duration       
<1 month 1.812 1.657 1.799 3.329 3.050 3.454 
 (0.101)* (0.180)* (0.123)* (0.060)* (0.101)* (0.075)* 
1-3 months 2.551 2.390 2.594 0.184 -0.020 0.285 
 (0.064)* (0.114)* (0.079)* (0.122) (0.211) (0.150) 
3-6 months 0.391 0.795 0.043 0.430 0.295 0.503 
 (0.151)* (0.212)* (0.220) (0.115)* (0.193) (0.144)* 
       
Constant -4.742 -4.854 -4.759 -4.199 -4.423 -4.182 
 (0.135)* (0.236)* (0.165)* (0.124)* (0.217)* (0.152)* 
       
Log L -4924 -1676 -3212 -4408 -1627 -2761 
Source: ULMS Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *  significant at 5% level    
 
 
Table A4.  Probit Estimates of After Displacement Wage Sample (1st Stage Selection) 
 Wage Level Wage 
Change 
Sample Mean 
 no returns 
Sample Mean 
returns 
Individual     
Age 16-24  0.077 0.001 0.11 0.11 
 (0.193) (0.196)   
Age 25-34  0.330  0.331 0.19 0.28 
 (0.136)* (0.141)*   
Age 35-44 0.287 0.252 0.32 0.36 
 (0.117)* (0.118)*   
Female -0.123 -0.078 0.54 0.51 
 (0.102) (0.102)   
Single 0.083 0.098 0.20 0.23 
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 (0.129) (0.131)     
Vocational higher  0.175 0.184 0.22 0.25 
 (0.109) (0.117)   
Graduate 0.290 0.276 0.12 0.17 
 (0.140)* (0.144)   
Region     
Centre & North -0.568 -0.471 0.29 0.19 
 (0.197)* (0.200)*   
East -0.088 -0.011 0.27 0.40 
 (0.185)   (0.181)   
South -0.195 -0.078 0.17 0.20 
 (0.201)   (0.204)     
West -0.783 -0.729 0.21 0.09 
 (0.211)* (0.207)*   
Firm     
Privatised  -0.168 -0.179 0.06 0.07 
 (0.187) (0.178)     
New Private -0.126 -0.064 0.17 0.22 
 (0.147) (0.148)   
Foreign Owned -0.473 -0.449 0.02 0.02 
 (0.397) (0.393)   
Tenure <1 year 0.084  0.078 0.11 0.11 
 (0.176) (0.182)   
Tenure 1-5 years 0.469 0.399 0.25 0.39 
 (0.141)* (0.143)*   
Tenure 5-10 years 0.137 0.130 0.20 0.21 
 (0.137) (0.139)   
Industry     
Agriculture -0.456 -0.458 0.12 0.10 
 (0.172)* (0.173)*   
Construction 0.020 0.033 0.07 0.08 
 (0.181) (0.183)   
Retail 0.145 0.103 0.14 0.23 
 (0.151) (0.152)   
Transport  0.010  0.025 0.07 0.07 
 (0.192) (0.189)   
Finance  0.177 -0.017 0.02 0.03 
 (0.256) (0.310)   
Public Service -0.217 -0.296 0.05 0.03 
 (0.260)   (0.278)     
Education/Health -0.185 -0.049 0.08 0.06 
 (0.218) (0.241)   
Other Services  0.165  0.059 0.06 0.07 
 (0.205) (0.252)   
Firm_size 100-999 0.253 0.219 0.28 0.29 
 (0.131)   (0.131)     
Firm Size 1000+ 0.218 0.203 0.15 0.17 
 (0.166)   (0.172)     
     
Ethnic Minority -0.051 -0.132 0.21 0.29 
 (0.085) (0.088)   
Children <6 years  0.033  0.053 0.12 0.15 
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 (0.136) (0.173)   
Female*children<6 -0.201 -0.352 0.06 0.06 
 (0.188) (0.184)   
Divorced/widowed 0.346  0.327 0.03 0.04 
 (0.186) (0.220)   
Farms a plot of land 0.089 -0.041 0.59 0.44 
 (0.078) (0.094)   
     
Log(old_wage)   4.48 4.81 
     
Constant -1.046 -1.000   
 (0.263)* (0.268)*   
Notes  Standard errors in brackets.  * statistically significant at the 5% level.  Sample of non-returners is 619. 
 
 
 
